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ABSTRACT
A methodology based on the current Department of Defense
budgetary process and recent efforts to model federal budget-
ary behavior is proposed for analyzing Congresional behavior
toward Department of Defense budget requests. Pour simple,
linear, stochastic models which associate Congressional
appropriations and DOD budget requests are suggested and
empirically tested via a cross-sectional regression analysis
for Procurement and Research, Development, Test and Evalua-
tion in the 1970-1973 time frame. Results of the tests are
tabulated and discussed. Model strengths as well as weak-
nesses are evaluated based on proportional and absolute
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Vietnam conflict and growing concern over dwindling
resources have aroused public and Congressional interest
in Department of Defense (DOD) expenditures. The analysis
presented in this thesis was suggested by this interest.
Analysis focuses on the interaction between Congress and
the Department of Defense in the federal budgetary process.
Specific effort is made to explain Congressional behavior
by evaluating four simple models which relate Congressional
appropriations and DOD budget requests.
In recent studies of the federal budgetary process,
Richard F. Fenno, Aaron Wildavsky, and the team of Demptster,
Davis, and Wildavsky have established themselves as leaders
in the study of the Congressional aspects of federal budget-
ary behavior. Fenno and Wildavsky are noted for their pains-
taking efforts in documenting Congressional appropriation
procedures and personalities; and Dempster, Davis, and
Wildavsky are recognized for expanding this verbal documen-
tation and proposing a series of simple, linear, stochastic
models to empirically test the hypothesis that federal bud-
getary processes can be modeled by simple (basically incre-
mental), linear decision rules which are stable over time
and applicable to a wide variety of institutions. In a
series of reports in a continuing study, Dempster, Davis,
and Wildavsky have focused their attention on time-series

analysis of both agency and Congressional behavior for
selected non-defense federal agencies over a period of
approximately 16 years (19^7-1963) • The data used was
taken from records of agency requests and Congressional
appropriations based on those requests.
Noticeably, Dempster, Davis, and Wildavsky have thus
far failed to consider the Department of Defense in their
data base although they have acknowledged that there is no
reason to believe that their methods would not be equally
applicable to DOD [Ref. 2, p. 301]. While there has been
no documented attempt to apply Dempster, Davis, and Wildav-
sky' s ideas to DOD, Arnold Kanter has studied Congressional
changes in DOD budget requests and concluded that Congress
is concerned foremost with national security objectives in
its appropriation action; and John Crecine and Greg Fischer
have attempted to model resource allocation within DOD via
a number of simple interactive, linear models, while stresing
the importance of macroeconomics and the overriding bureau-
cratic factors in determining DOD expenditures.
The purpose of this thesis is to suggest, express mathe-
matically, and empirically test four simple, linear, stochas-
tic models which seek to explain Congressional behavior
(manifested by an appropriation) toward the President's
Defense budget requests. These models are in fact an effort
to mathematically express the verbal theories of Wildavsky
and Fenno and are in the tradition of Dempster, Davis, and
Wildavksy's work with non-defense agencies.

The actual organization of the analysis includes back-
ground on the defense budget process and a detailed discus-
sion of the methodology used in specifying the models. In
this background and discussion, effort is made to identify
possible roles and impacts of Congress in the overall
budget process. These sections are followed by a chapter
on collecting appropriate data and empirically testing the
suggested models. This is followed by a comprehensive
report of the empirical results. Finally, analysis and
significance of the empirical results are discussed and




This section will cover background material on the place
of Congress and the Defense Department in the defense budget
cycle. A detailed chronology of the defense budget will be
given which, at its end, will suggest the possible operation
of simple decision rules during various points of the pro-
cess. Current literature on federal budgetary behavior is
then surveyed. The verbal theories of Wildavsky and Fenno
are described and the notion of simple decision rules to
describe budget processes is reinforced by evidence of the
use of base figures and incrernentalism in Congressional
action on budget requests. Finally, four mathematical
models are formulated which are consistent with the evidence
of simple decision rules presented in the detailed chronology
and the federal budgetary literature survey.
1 . Congress, Defense Department and the Budget Cycle
Philosophically, "budgeting deals with the purposes
of men"; more pointedly, the budget was described by Wildav-
sky as "a link between financial resources and human behavior
to accomplish policy objectives" [Ref. 26, p. 1], In the
process of allocating resources, a budget becomes a mechanism
for making choices among alternative expenditures. In
terms of Department of Defense budget requests, if interac-
tions among constrained objectives, substitutive programs,

and contradicting feelings within DOD and Congress are
regarded as conflict, then, in Wildavsky's words, "the budget
records the outcomes of this struggle" [Ref. 26, p. 4].
The Department of Defense (D0D) budgeting cycle can
be viewed as a chronological sequence of events in which a
continuous interaction among the major. participants (i.e. DOD,
Congress, and the President) occurs. The actual sequence
involves a preparation phase (within DOD but with Presiden-
tial fiscal guidance and final budget approval), Congressional
review and appropriation, final DOD resource allocation, and
audit. The formal chronological sequence provides structure
to the budgetary cycle but does not reveal the informal
structure or decision process which the interaction among
participants reveals. While the chronology sequences those
events which might shape Congressional behavior, interaction
among the participants (primarily DOD and Congress) in this
flow emphasizes the continuous nature of Congressional appro-
priation behavior. This behavior is evident in accepted
roles and expectations of DOD (as an Agency) and Congress.
In the formulation of any models to explain collec-
tive Congressional behavior toward DOD budget request, it
is important to understand when DOD and Congress appear
explicitly in the chronology. It is also important to
identify the possible impact of interaction between Congress
and DOD throughout the entire budget process.
However, it is also important at this point to note
that this analysis only specifically studied Congresional
8

behavior from the time of budget submission to actual appro-
priation. Whereas it is reasonable to believe that the
entire budget cycle might impact on Congressional appro-
priation behavior and to formulate models accordingly,
only the actual flow of the budget request through the
relevant House and Senate Authorization and Appropriation
Committees and accompanying interaction between DOD and
those committees was considered in the formulation and testing
of the models used in this analysis of Congressional
appropriation behavior.
2. Chronology of the Defense Budget Process
Congress appears in the middle , so to speak, of the
chronological sequence of DOD budgeting. Prior to budget
request submission to Congress, the DOD budget has undergone
a formal 18-month preparation cycle of planning, programming,
and budgeting within DOD (referred to as the Planning,
Programming, and Budgeting System) . The planning cycle is
approximately six months long and primarily involves threat
analysis dialogue and eventual consensus among the Secretary
of Defense, National Security Council, and the Joint Chiefs
of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force. The pro-
gramming cycle is nine months. This cycle involves a dia-
logue betwen Service Chiefs and the Office of the Secretary
of Defense (OSD) . Key documents are exchanged, reviewed,
and commented upon and at the end of the cycle OSD publishes
Program Decision Memos which assimilate all relevant opinions
and approves the various force levels, weapons systems, and

resources needed in the next five years to meet agreed upon
threats. The budgeting cycle follows in the next three
months and involves "crosswalking" (transforming) program
budget requests (in terms of outputs, i.e., force levels
,
weapons systems, etc.) into Congressional budget appropri-
ations categories (in terms of inputs, e.g. for the Navy,
Manpower (MPN), Operations and Maintenance (OMN) , Procurement
Air and Missile (PAMN), Ship Construction (SCN), Other
Procurement (OPN), and Research, Development, Test and
Evaluation (RDTE)) for the current five year program. The
first year of this "crosswalked" five year plan is then
"peeled off" and submitted to Congress for appropriations
action.
If interest were focused on the fiscal year 197^
DOD budget, then the PPB cycle would have begun in June,
1971 and terminated in January, 1973 with budget submission
to Congress. Congress, then, in six months must review and
appropriate funds based on the submitted budget. In actuality,
the procedure may' take considerably longer since the final
Defense Appropriation Bill is the result of a complex path
of authorization and appropriation action which calls for
separate House and Senate action. In each case where the
House and Senate cannot reach a consensus, conference action
is required to effect compromise. The procedure is high-
lighted by the passage of a Defense Authorization Bill for
Procurement and RDTE which is the primary responsibility
of the House and Senate Armed Service Committees and finally
10

the Defense Appropriation Bill which is the primary respon-
sibility of the Defense Appropriations Subcommittees of
the House and Senate Appropriations Committees. Each step
in the movement of a DOD budget request through the Congress
is part of a sequence, the components of which constrain
or limit the final appropriation action. For example, the
budget request first goes to the House Armed Services Commit-
tee where upper bounds can be set for final appropriation
action. A similar upper bound is given by the Senate Armed
Services Committee. If, after floor action, the two upper
bounds do not agree, the difference is settled in a joint
conference session. The resulting authorization bill (re-
ported concurrence from the House and Senate that an amount
not to exceed a stated upper bound can be appropriated for
each of the military service budget requests) is then passed
to the respective House and Senate Appropriations Subcommittees
on DOD where a similar process takes place.
The final Department of Defense Appropriation Bill
reflects a new obligational authority (NOA) for each budget
request. This NOA allows DOD to sign contracts for the
amount of the NOA at any time during the obligational period
associated with the budget category. For example, Manpower
and Operations and Maintenance are one-year periods, while
MPN and OMN are not considered by either the House or
Senate Armed Services Committee.
11

Procurement Air and Missile is three. Ship Building and
Conversion Five, and Research, Development, Test and
Evaluation two years.
The approved budget is then given back to DOD where
the Services actually allocate resources. In this pahse,
the budget is "crosswalked" back to program categories and
resources are allocated to programs. In this pahse, DOD
is also allowed to reprogram (or rechannel some of its funds
into other programs) subject to certain constraints [Ref. 21].
Record is kept of resource allocation and reprogramming by
Congressional budget categories. These records are summarized
semiannually and the summaries are sent to Congressional
committees for use in budgeting authorization or appropria-
tion decisions. These documents are also available to OSD
and the General Accounting Office for audit of ongoing
service programs.
The chronological sequence just discussed structures
the DOD budgeting process and to a certain extent gives
evidence of how that structure may affect Congressional
behavior toward a DOD budget request.
From this annual, regualr sequence of events, it is
reasonable to suggest a simple model (or series of models)
using reported appropriations and budget requests which
attempt to explain Congressional behavior toward approved
budget requests. Yet, as previously stated, this sequence
might not reveal the informal structure or decision process
which is continuously evident in interaction between Congress
12

and DOD throughout the budgeting process. There is evidence
available in documented observations of this interaction
(primarily by Penno and Wildavsky) to reinforce a simple
model approach to collective Congressional budgetary behavior,
Before formulating the models actually used, it is essential
to describe these observed interactions and related verbal
theories.
B. BUDGETING LITERATURE
The works of Wildavsky ( The Theory of the Budgetary
Process ) and Fenno ( The Power of the Purse ) represent current
theory on federal budgetary behavior. Both works were based
on numerous interviews of both Agency and Congressional
officials and years of observing Congressional appropriations
action. This small section will discuss documented Congres-
sional/Agency effort to eliminate uncertainty in their budget
interactions and evidence of Congressional use of base
figures and incrementalism in determining appropriations.
The complexities of Congressional/DOD interaction are
well known and openly admitted. George H. Mahon, Chairman
of the Subcommittee on Department of Defense, Committee on
Appropriations, House of Representatives stated:
No human being regardless of his position
and capacity could possibly be completely
familiar with all the items of appropriations
contained in a defense bill [Ref. 26, p. 10].
While a member of the same subcommittee, former Secretary
Laird said, "A lot of things go on in this subcommittee that
13

I cannot understand" [Ref. 26, p. 91. Since this interaction
takes place in a complex, dynamic, and often turbulent
environment, the models to be suggested later share a funda-
mental assumption that individuals and organizations when
operating in this environment will actively seek to elimin-
ate uncertainty wherever possible. Adjustment or adaptation
to this environmental field is predicated on two mechanisms
which Cyert and March observed by which organizations attempt
to reduce uncertainty. First, organizations avoid the uncer-
tainty of long-range planning by relying on short-run reac-
tion to feedback from the environment (this mechanism makes
sense only if the environment can be assumed stable in the
short-run). And secondly, organizations attempt to arrange
a negotiated environment or at least a receptive or predictive
one [Ref. 16, p. 6].
This shared assumption that participants in a complex,
dynamic environment will actively seek to eliminate uncer-
tainty by creating a stable, predictive environment has been
observed by Wildavsky and Fenno as fundamental in Congress/
Agency budget interactions. Fenno, in The Power of the Purse
,
stated the problem and observed solution this way:
Agency officials feel they cannot be sure
what the committee will do: committee members
feel they cannot be sure they have the infor-
mation they need. Both seek increased certain-




Fenno consolidates his observations on the behavior of the
participants into expectations or roles of agencies and
committees with respect to each other. Agency expectations
toward committees were of two sorts: those pertaining to
substantive goals and those pertaining primarily to the
maintenance of a stable relationship between the two groups
[Ref. 13 5 p. 266]. One of the maintenance expectations of
the agency appeared to be a desire for a high degree of
predictability or certainty in its committee relations
[Ref. 13, p. 273]. Also agencies believed that committees
should follow fair procedures in dealing with them. The
Congressional Appropriations Committee members, as noted by
Fenno j believed in their agency interaction that the agency
be "frank and open and should not attempt to cover-up or
hold back relevant information" [Ref. 13, p. 320].
With these observations of Congressional roles and their
impact on DOD budgeting in mind, it is not unreasonable
to hypothesize that Congressional behavior might be explained
by a model (or series of models) that was simple and stable
over time. Further, it will be shown it is also reasonable
to hypothesize that this model might be linear. This
simplistic approach has been substantiated by evidence
(which follows in the next paragraph) that Congress uses
a base figure (for each agency) and appropriates funds
according to some incremental increase or decrease in that
figure. Such incrementalism suggests a possible percentage
15

argument which is very appealing to both common sense and
the linear modeling assumption.
Wildavsky, in The Politics of the Budgetary Process
,
defined a base as "the general expectation among participants
that programs will be carried on at close to the going level
of expenditures but it does not necessarily include all
activities" [Ref. 26, p. 17]. Fenno noted that agency
expectations are that the Appropriations Committees will
accept its "base" (core program) and focus decision-making
on the increment being requested. Also, Penno observed the
Appropriation Committees to perceive their oversight and
budget-reducing tasks as essentially incremental operations.
He further stated:
Just as the agency considers much of its
request to be beyond controversy, so too
does the Committee act on this assumption by
restricting its purview to those budgetary
increments granted in the previous year and
requested for the coming year [Ref. 13 5 p. 318]
Although the research of Fenno and Wildavsky involved
non-defense agencies, they were attempting to make general
statements concerning Congressional appropriation behavior.
This idea is supported by the fact that most Defense
Subcommittee members also sit on non-defense subcommittees.
Hence, it is not unreasonable to attempt to extend the ideas




Realizing the relative position and impact of Congress
on the DOD budgeting process and drawing upon evidence
gathered by Wildavsky and Fenno that Agency/Congress budget
rules might be simple and stable over time, four models
were suggested to explain Congressional behavior in regard
to DOD budget requests. These models were all linear and
involved postulated relationships among Congressional appro-
priations and budget requests. In each model, the constant
term normally seen in a linear model was suppressed in order
to interpret each coefficient as a percentage figure.
Although intuitively appealing, this idea did present some
difficulty in the empirical testing and evaluation of the
models later in the analysis. In addition, each model
contained a random disturbance element which accounted for
events which might upset the simplicity and linearity of
the models or in some way affect the inherent stability in
the modeled budget process. Such events would be exogenous
to the budget process and would include international events,
administration changes, or indications of strong public
opinion in a particular area.
In each model, the variables had the following meaning:
Y, - current year Congressional appropriation (a
final figure which includes all relevant House
and Senate authorization and appropriation
' action on the request)
X - current year appropriation request (approved
t by the President)
17

Y, , - previous year Congressional appropriation
(except in noted cases where current year
program^ was used as a substitute for previous
year appropriation)
X, , - previous year appropriation request (except in
noted cases where previous year authorization
was used as a substitute for previous year
appropriation request)






This model states that the current year appropriation











- B Y ^ + e
This model states that the current year appropriation is
a percentage of last year's appropriation (which constitutes
a "base" figure) plus a percentage of the difference between
this years request and the "base" figure plus a random
disturbance.
MODEL C: Y = B X + Bp(X. - B X ) + e




This model states that the current year appropriation is
a percentage of last years request (which constitutes a
"base" figure) plus a percentage of the difference between
this years request and the "base" figure plus a random
disturbance
.
MODEL D: Y, = B..Y. . + e
t 1 t-1
This model states that the current year appropriation
is a percentage of last years appropriation plus a random
disturbance. (This model was suggested by a high correlation
between current year and previous year appropriation noticed
in testing Models A, B, and C.)
It should be noted that these models suppress any
difference in the outlook of House and Senate Armed Services
Committees or Appropriations Committees. In the variable
Y . , the models have aggregated authorization action (commit-
tee, floor, and conference action) and appropriation action
(committee, floor, and conference action) . For studies of
the differences between House and Senate appropriations
actions see Fenno [Ref. 13] and Kanter [Ref. 17]
•
All models, especially A and D, reflect incremental
behavior on the part of Congress. This view is consistent
with the presence of incrementalism observed by Wildavsky
and Fenno. Models B and C primarily reflect a base concept
(i.e. BY, and B.X ,_, for Models B and C respectively)
which again is consistent with observations of Congressional
19

budgetary behavior by Wildavsky and Penno. All models are
consistent with the idea of simple decision rules suggested
first in the detailed chronology of the DOD budget process




Before actually selecting a data base for testing the
models, recent (1950-1973) aggregations of Congressional change
to DOD budget requests were studied to isolate (if possible)
a time period (or periods) when Congressional change to
requests was highest. It appears that the 1969-1973 time
period reflected the greatest Congressional change to DOD
budget requests [Ref. 18, p. 5]. During this period (notably-
linked with administration changes in the V/hlte House and DOD
and national discontent), Congressional change averaged 5.6%
while the average prior to those years (from 1950) was barely
over 2.2% [Ref. 18]. Also, changes in Procurement and RDTE
during this period averaged better than 12% and 7% respective-
ly, while Personnel and Operations and Maintenance averaged
less than 2% and 3% respectively. While these figures are a
practical justification for this entire analysis, they also
greatly aided in determining an appropriate data base for
testing the suggested models.
Penno in The Power of the Purse suggested that any
Congressional change less than 5% was of marginal use in
analyzing Congressional appropriation behavior [Ref. 13>
p. 353]. Using this criteria, attention, was narrowed to
Procurement and RDTE budget requests and appropriations in
the 1969-1973 time frame.
In order to empirically test the four models presented
in the preceding chapter, a data base that included at
least current year appropriation and request was needed.
21

The data sources available were spread sheets used by the
Senate Committee on Armed Services (printed by the Committee)
[Ref. 24]-, summary tables prepared by Services in Hearings
before Senate and House Subcommittees on Appropriations
[Ref. 6,7] , summaries of DOD reprogramming changes reflected
in DDl4l6 (printed by the Comptroller Office of the Depart-
ment of the Navy) [Ref. 20], and summaries of Congressional
Action by Appropriate Title and Item (printed by Comptroller
OSD) [Ref. 3]. These documents reflected basic budget
categories and their activities; and included at least
requests and appropriations for the current fiscal year.
Senate Armed Services Committee spread sheets, reported
the desired Procurement and Research, Development, Test and
Evaluation (RDTE) budget categories. Because of a multitude
of format changes in DOD budget requests and Congressional
authorization and appropriation categories, aggregations
of reported requests and appropriations were frequently
inconsistent over time. For example, fiscal year 1973
Procurement spread sheets reflected Torpedoes as a separate
budget category for the first time (prior to then, torpedoes
were part of Ammunition Procurement). Activities within
categories have also frequently changed. RDTE 1971 reflected
12 more activities under Military Sciences - Army than RDTE
1973; and even among the nine which were similar in code
number there were noted differences in word descriptions
of the codes [Ref. 24]. Certain data was also inaccessible
22

because of security classification and administration
peculiarities within Congress and the Office of the Secretary
of Defense (OSD) . While these deficiencies posed certain
analytical difficulties and constraints (chiefly the pre-
clusion of a time-series analysis), the data did present an
accurate report, as determined by cross-referencing, of
Congressional appropriations and DOD requests in the 1970-
1973 time frame. Sufficient detail was available to
accom-
plish a cross-sectional analysis on selected accounts within
the Procurement and RDTE categories of DOD appropriations.
Because of the accepted importance of committee and
subcommittee action in determining appropriations, spread
sheets printed by the Senate Armed Services Committee and
those tables listed in reports of the Defense Appropriations
Subcommittee Hearings were studied in detail to determine
an appropriate aggregation level for testing the models.
Both documents reflected three major data aggregation
divisions
:































The Sub-Categories level was chosen as the appropriate
account level of analysis. These categories, particularly
within RDTE, seemed most stable over time and were neatly
summarized on one page of the Committee spread sheets for
easy reference of committee members [Ref. 24]. In addi-
tion, these categories represented the last categorical
division before a detailed listing of activities within the
sub-category. Given competing demands of activities in a
sub-category and Congressional time constraints, the
Sub-category level seemed the best level of aggregation
(account level) for analyzing Congressional appropriation
behavior toward DOD budget requests at the account level,
especially when testing simple linear models.
With this concept of a DOD account, Procurement and RDTE
were analyzed separately for each year sufficient data was
available. Categories which comprised the respective data
bases of Procurement and RDTE are listed in Figure III-l
and III-2. Data was taken from Committee spread sheets and

























Category initiated in 1971




Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation
Army
Military Sciences
Aircraft and Related Equipment
Missiles and Related Equipment
Military Astronautics
Ordnance, Combat Vehicles, and Related Equipment
Other Equipment
Programwide Management and Support
Navy
Military Sciences
Aircraft and Related Equipment
Missiles and Related Equipment
Military Astronautics
Ships and Small Craft Related Equipment
Ordnance, Combat Vehicles, and Related Equipment
Other Equipment
Programwide Management and Support
Air Force
Military Sciences
Aircraft and Related Equipment
Missiles and Related Equipment
Military Astronautics
Ordnance, Combat Vehicles, and Related Equipment
Other Equipment
Programwide Management and Support
Defense Agencies^
Military Science







Categories in this area vary considerably from year
to year; categories listed appear to be the most stable
































Prior to regression analysis, plots were made of current
year appropriations vs current year request, prior year
request, and prior year appropriation to get a relative feel
for the validity of assuming linear models and further, to
gain a general idea of the impact of suppressing the constant
term in the fit of the data to a line. The plots (see Figure
III-3 and 111-4 for Procurement and RDTE 197D revealed a
strong linear relationship between current year appropriation
and current year budget request and also a strong indication
that the constant term (if included in the analysis) would
have little impact on the true line fit to the data. Also,
possible heteroscedastic bias (relationship of the magnitude
of the residuals to the magnitude of the independent varia-
bles) was examined since the data analysis is confined to
the 1st quadrant (i.e. the smaller the value of the indepen-
dent variable the smaller the value of the residual) . This
potential problem was further investigated in a graphical
study of residuals vs current year appropriation, previous
year appropriation, current year request, and previous year
request when each model was tested.
Multiple linear regression analysis was then used to
test the four suggested models with the appropriate accumu-
lated data. The BIOMED series of statistical programs on
No significant patterns of residuals were noted but



















































multiple and step-wise linear regression were used for
computational ease. The programs were modified to suppress
the constant term and generate the required coefficients
and accompanying output to support comparisons among
coefficients and models.
The test runs were organized in the following manner
(an "x" means the model was tested):














As stated earlier, the primary sources for appropriation and
request data used in testing the models were the spread
2
sheets used by the Senate Committee on Armed Services.
These sources were corroborated by the others mentioned and
thought to be the most accurate documentation available of
2Recent studies by E. Laurance (Naval Postgraduate
School) have shown an emerging dominance of the Senate




Congressional appropriation behavior. Except where noted,
the models were tested using appropriation and request data
from these spread sheets. With the idea that subcommittee
members might desire to use only a single spread sheet
(for simplicity) and be interested in the most current data,
substitutions of authorization and program data were used
for previous year request and appropriation where spread
sheets tabled these figures and not prior year requests and
appropriations. For example, RDTE [Ref. 24] summarized
current year request and appropriation but indicated current
year program (last years appropriation modified by reprogram-
ming) rather than prior year appropriation. In this case,
it did not seem unreasonable to assume that current year
program was a good substitute for prior year appropriation.
Similarly, Procurement [Ref. 24] reported prior year authori-
zation rather than prior year request.
The suggested models were then run as described earlier
with the constant term suppressed. In the following section,
results will be presented. Particular attention will be
paid to the appropriateness of certain statistics generated





The four suggested models were first placed In a reduced
form compatible with the multiple-linear regression programs
used for actual testing. As they appeared in their structural
form, the models were
MODEL A: Y
fc
= B^ + e
MODEL B: Y. = B
n
Y^ . + B (X, - B
n
Y,_ . ) + e















= B^^x + e
Model A and D, as stated, were in their5 reduced form. Model
B and C required the following calculation:
































Calculation is shown only for Model B but calculation
for C is similar.
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The four reduced form models were




= a^ + a^^ + e
MODEL C: Y = a X + a X + e
MODEL D: Y. = a
n
Y,_ . + e
t 1 t-1
These models were then run In accordance with Table I
which again outlines the cross-sectional analysis possible
within the existing data base . The BIOMED multiple linear
regression package was used in the suppressed constant mode
to evaluate the relevant estimated coefficients for each
model. The resulting coefficients are shown in Table II.
In terms of the incremental (or percentage) significance
attached to the values of the coefficients, they all seemed
plausible with the possible exception of the -0.0^42 value
of a
?
evaluated in the 1970 Procurement B Model and the 1.082
value of a evaluated in the 1973 RDTE D(Program) Model.
The latter was readily explained by a study of the data
which revealed a significant increase in DOD RDTE funds in
1973 over those appropriated in 1972. The former figure was
explained by an investigation of the significance of the
coefficients in each model using a two-tailed "t" test at
the .05 level to test the null hypothesis a. = (that the
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The test statistic was formed by taking the quotient of the
value of the coefficient and its standard error and comparing
it to the tabled value of t corresponding to the .05 level
and the appropriate degrees of freedom. A test value
smaller than the tabled value indicated the null hypothesis
2
could not be rejected at the .05 level. In accomplishing
this test, those coefficients indicated by an asterisk ( ft )
in Table II were found to be statistically insignificant.
The value of a
?
in the B Model Procurement 1970 was among
those found insignificant.
The results of this test also revealed an apparent
inconsistency in the 1973 Procurement Models B and C
(Authorization) where both coefficients in each model were
apparently statistically insignificant. This was particu-
larly notable since corresponding models in 1970 and 1971
have at least one coefficient which is significant. In
fact, the apparent inconsistency is attributable to a multi-
collinearity effect which surfaced in the B and C (Authori-
zation) models in '1973. Multicollinearity among independent
variables usually manifests itself in high correlations in
the printed correlation matrix of a tested model or in unusu-
ally high jumps in the standard error of coefficients upon
the addition of another variable to the regression. The
See Theil [Ref. 25, p. 138] and Military Equipment Cost




latter result, demonstrated in the B and C(A) Models, Is
an indication that current year budget requests and prior
year appropriation or prior year request were so highly
3
correlated that matrix inversion (used to solve for the
coefficients) was unstable. Although high correlation
matrices were noted in other tested models, the correlations
were not high enough to affect any other calculations.
The reduced form estimated coefficients were then trans-
formed into structural model estimated coefficients by a
substitutiveprocess . Of course, the single variable models
required no transformation. A sample of the two-variable
5transformation is shown below and the structured coefficients
are contained in Table III.
This is not surprising since according to Dempster,
Davis, and Wildavsky, agency requests are a simple linear
function of prior year appropriation [Ref. 53.
4
In order to invert a matrix, in this case the correlation
matrix, the matrix must be non-singular (full rank) . If
correlations among variables are high enough, the computer
routines will try to invert a singular matrix and unstable
results will occur.
5MODEL B: Structured Form: Y
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Note: These estimated coefficients are consistent in a statis-
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In evaluating the fit of the models to the data, the
greater the dispersion of the observed values of Y (the
current year appropriation) about the generated line, the
less accurate the estimates of Y, that are based on that
line are likely to be. In this respect, discussion of the
respective fits of the four models to their data will center
on two measures of dispersion: an adjusted coefficient of
determination (R ) and the coefficient of variation (CV)
.
The reason for this two fold approach is the difference in
the two measures. Both are indicators of dispersion but
—2
R is based on a proportion and the coefficient of variation
is based on an absolute quantity (the standard error of the
estimate). See Figure IV-1 . As such, even if the explained
variance represented a high fraction of the total variance,
it would be possible for the unexplained variance to be
large relative to the estimated Y. (current year predicted
appropriation)
.
For these reasons, the adjusted coefficient of determina-
o
tion (R ) and the' coefficient of variation (CV) were used
as measures of model fit to the given data.
The suppressed constant model, as an option in the BIOMED
series of multiple-linear regression models computes all
variances, covariances, standard deviations, and correlations
about the origin rather than the mean. As such, this model,
—2






p-2 _ Explained Variance
Total Variance
pv = ~v Unexplained Variance
Y. = Observed appropriation
Y = Mean value of the observed appropriation
Y. = Predicted value of an appropriation,
n = Number of observations of Y.

















the fit of the line to the data. Consequently, it was
necessary to calculate, separately, the total variance
—2figure in order to apply the formula for R . Using the
—p
proper computed total variance, R was calculated and
placed into Table IV.
In comparing the standard errors of the estimates (SE)
for each model, the coefficient of variation (CV) was used
As previously described, the coefficient of variation is
SE
CV = Y
In a sense, the SE is weighted by its respective Y to make
comparisons among standard errors more relevant. Ideally,
the smaller the CV for a given model, the more reliable
is the estimate. Although no set figures have been given,
percentages no greater than 20$ are generally considered
acceptable fits [Ref. 23, p. W.
The appropriate statistics for the CV calculation were
gathered for each 'model and the corresponding CV figures
were placed into Table V.
With the test runs, estimated coefficients for the
reduced and structural models, and appropriate measures of
65-2
-, , . . , 5-2 -> Unexplained VarianceR may also be stated as R = 1 - ~ , v -,?—;J Total Variance
Using this form, it is easily seen why computing total
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model fit summarized in Tables I-V, it was then possible to
address the appropriateness of the models as explanations
of Congressional appropriation behavior toward DOD budget
requests and to comment further on Dempster, Davis, and
Wildavsky's contention that DOD can be modeled as any other
federal agency. Discussion of these points follows in
Chapter V - Analysis and Significance of Results.
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V. ANALYSIS AND SIGNIFICANCE OP RESULTS
A. ANALYSIS OF RESULTS
Robert R. Brown in Explanation in Social Science stated
that explanation "seeks to remove impediments" [Ref. 1, p. 4l]
To this end, the tested models (or decision rules) have at
least partially explained the behavior of Congress in the
complex DOD budgeting process. In the reported proprtional
and absolute measures of fit for each rule (see Tables IV and
V), very little variance in a proportional and absolute sense
was left unexplained. The data used in the D Model (Procure-
ment) (using prior year appropriation to explain a current
year appropriation) in 1970 did give unfavorable results, but
an analysis of the programs contained in the budget categories
reflected program deletions of an unusually large magnitude
(i.e. the dropping of the Army Cheyene Helicopter, the Navy
A-7E, and the Navy Fast Deployment Logistics Ship (FDL))
which might have accounted for the poor overall fit of the
data to the model: What is significant in the fact that
decision rules generally fit the data very well is the
indication that a seemingly complex process can be at least
partially explained by a few simple, linear decision rules.
This fact is more significant when it is realized that
the postulated models (or decision rules) were not the result
of a "data crunching" exercise to determine a "best fit"
model. The models were formulated based on observed inter-
action between agency and Congress and the documented success
45

of Dempster, Davis, and Wildavsky in using similar models
in analyzing non-defense federal budgetary behavior. As
such, the results are one more addition to a growing line
of literature documenting Congressional use of simple
decision rules in non-defense and defense budgeting. It is
also significant to note that Dempster, Davis, and Wildavsky
found the A Model (using current year request to explain
current year appropriation) to be the best fit for their
data. In this analysis, the A Model was also found to be
the best fit for the data. This fact again supports the
Congressional use of simple, linear decision rules through-
out non-defense and defense budget processes (a fact suggested
by Dempster, Davis, and Wildavsky in their studies [Ref. 2,
p. 301].
Perhaps the most striking significance of the results is
the inherent difference in non-defense and defense appropri-
ations. Results, as indicated in the A Model of this analysis
were roughly comparable to those achieved by Dempster, Davis,
and Wildavsky in their studies. Yet, unlike non-defense
appropriations which authorize expenditure for a single year
in a program that is quite stable, Procurement and RDTE
appropriations involve obligational authority to programs
which vary from year to year and obligational authority which
varies in length from two to five years. In this light, there
is no real reason to believe, as there might be with annual
operating accounts, that simple, linear models would fit the
data as well as discovered.
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In general then, the proposed simple, linear decision
rules seem to have considerable explanatory power in reveal-
ing Congressional behavior toward budget requests. This
view is strengthened by the use of verbal theory (outlined
in the efforts of Wildavsky and Fenno) and the results of
Dempster, Davis, and Wildavsky ! s studies of non-defense
federal budgetary behavior in formulating the models. And,
finally the significance of the successful application of
the models is enhanced by the fact that Procurement and RDTE
programs change constantly and appropriations involve multi-
year obligations of funds.
B. AREAS FOR FURTHER ANALYSIS
Cross-sectional analysis was used exclusively in this
study. As such, the coefficients, designed to be interpreted
as percentage figures, only reflect budgetary behavior for
either Procurement or RDTE in a particular year. These
figures might reveal overall budget behavior but they reveal
little about what is going on in any single category such as
military sciences (ARMY) or aircraft procurement (ARMY). To
determine what is going on in a particular category it would
be necessary to collect data for that category for a longer
period of time (say 10-15 years) and do a time series
analysis. In a cross-sectional analysis, a study of the
residuals for each year will Identify those categories which
least fit the model, but a detailed analysis of residuals is
necessary to reveal any specific rules which might be
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applicable to a specific category. Such time series or
cross-sectional analysis would reveal pecularities of a
particular category which might be interesting to DOD
"agencies" responsible for that particular budget request.
Still, cross-sectional analysis with available data did
reveal certain budget behavior in the four year period
covered. First, the single variable (Model A) produced
better data fit in each year and also produced more consist- .
ent (and believable) coefficients for each year studied.
While Model D produced coefficients of comparable consistency
to those produced in Model A and in general explained much of
the variance (see Table IV), the absolute measure of fit for
each year with these models was considerably worse than the
other models (which were primarily a function of current
year request — not prior year appropriation) (see Table V).
Significant also is the lack of any discernible pattern in
the coefficients reported for each successive year using
multi-variable decision rules (see Table III) . These views
suggest that A Model, the simplest of all models, also
possesses the greatest explanatory power. The failure of the
more complex models to produce consistent (or believable)
coefficients is perhaps an indication that Congressional
behavior is manifested in a two stage process. The first,
a very simple decision rule to roughly determine the
No particular patterns of residuals were noticed in
analyzing the given data; but a thorough investigation of
residuals was not conducted.
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particular cut for a given year and second, the presence
of a more complex procedure (which may or may not be
explained by an analytical model) to determine where parti-
cular cuts will be made once the general decision rule has
been applied. Further analysis is needed in this area.
Model A appears to possess the greatest explanatory power
of any model tested in this analysis. As such, information
which can be derived or otherwise taken from the coefficient
generated is of considerable importance in the analysis.
For each year, the coefficient in the A Model describes a
general rule — not associated with any one particular
category but representative of all categories in either
Procurement or RDTE in that year. Ideally, the coefficient
should remain stable over a period of years. For example,
coefficients in the A Model, particularly in RDTE appear
somewhat stable over the years covered (a= .904, a= .967,
a= .948). But, there was quite a difference' in the size of
the Procurement coefficient in 1971 and 1973 (a= .912 in
1971 and a= .8068 in 1973). Further research is also needed
in this area of coefficient stability.
A possible avenue for further research in coefficient
stability and other topics presented itself when Model D
(current year appropriation as explained by prior year
appropriation) was examined. When consecutive year cross-
sectional analysis is accomplished, the resulting coeffi^
cient ignores any impact of prior year appropriation on
current year request. That Model D fits the data at all is
49

evidence that prior year appropriation is somehow related
to current year request. This leads one to suspect that the
analysis contained in this thesis has perhaps considered
only half the problem. In a consecutive year study }
current year appropriation (as an indication of Congressional
budgetary behavior) appears to impact on the following year
budget request. Before any significance can be attached
to numerical stability or instability of coefficients
generated from year to year, perhaps a detailed analysis of
"account" behavior should be accomplished. Should similar
models be formulated to explain account behavior and should
the decision rules fit the data as well as the models in this
analysis, several significant conclusions might be drawn.
First, coefficient stability or instability for the Congress
may be related to what decision rules the agency has been
using in formulating its request. Second, if decision rules
for both the Congress and the agency were known, DOD would
be better able to predict budget requests which would most
likely fit Congressional decision rules. Of course, Congress
would, be in the same position. There is evidence (notably
in the Committee and Sub-Committee Hearings on Defense and
studies of Dempster, Davis, and Wildavsky in non-defense) to
suggest that such a "give and take" procedure already exists,
but the formalization of the process in analytic terms could
significantly aid DOD in the continuation or selection of
certain high dollar programs. Finally, if this two model
theory were to work, it would have significant implications
50

for the question of Presidential influence since the decision
rules basically involve only actions of Congress and DOD.
C . SUMMARY
Increasing Congressional influence on DOD expenditures,
particularly in Procurement and RDTE 1969-1973 [Ref. 18],
suggested and supported this study of Congressional budget
behavior toward DOD requests. A detailed chronology of the
DOD budget cycle and a survey of the work of Wildavsky and
Fenno in Congressional budgetary behavior suggested Congres-
sional use of simple, stable decision rules in determining
appropriations for DOD budget requests. Four mathematical
models were designed to express the simple and stable
Congressional decision rules suggested by Wildavsky and
Fenno. The models were also designed to be consistent with
Wildavsky' s and Fenno' s observations of a base figure and
incrementalism in Congressional appropriations behavior.
The models were then tested at an appropriate account level
with RDTE and Procurement data in the 1970-1973 time frame.
Proportional and absolute measures of explained and
unexplained variance were used to make statements about
model fit to the data.
In terms of these measures, it appears that at least
part of a complex DOD budgetary process can be explained by
these simple mathematical models. In addition, the success
of these models has suggested deeper analysis into specific
Congressional behavior toward particular DOD budget categories.
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Finally, the results suggested the idea of a game theoretic
approach to DOD budgeting where both DOD and Congress act
like opponents in a two-player game and adjust their
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Data in thousands of dollars,
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33,500 162,900 90,400 94,200
2,822,100 3,276,200 3,154,900 3,254,900
2,239,300 3,255,700 2,899,000 3,029,800
668,200 896,700 940,820 1,066,100
719,240 842,400 700,100 704,100
22,100 22,100 1,300 1,300
1,670,000 1,816,800 1,633,700 1,791,200
2,970,600 3,564,300 3,005,200 3,067,100
130,500 260,700 112,500 112,500
54,500 62,200 63,900 63,900
..
; 56,300 114,400 33,000 33,000
25,700 25,700 1,300 1,300
900 900 1,000 1,000
192,400 194,200 193,500 193,500
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Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation
Army
Military Sciences :d
Aircraft and Related Equipment (2)
Missiles and Related Equipment :3)
Military Astronautics :4)
Ordnance, Combat Vehicles, and Related Equipment :s)
Other Equipment :6)
Programwide Management and Support :7)
Navy
Military Sciences 18)
Aircraft and Related Equipment (9)
Missiles and Related Equipment ;io)
Military Astronautics ;n)
Ships and Small Craft Related Equipment ;i2)
Ordnance, Combat Vehicles, and Related Equipment ;i3)
Other Equipment :i4)
Programwide Management and Support :i5)
Air Force
Military Sciences :i6)
Aircraft and Related Equipment (17)
Missiles and Related Equipment :i8)
Military Astronautics (19)
Ordnance, Combat Vehicles, and Related Equipment (20)
Other Equipment (21)
Programwide Management and Support (22)
Defense Agencies-*-
Military Science (23)






Categories in this area vary considerably from year to































































































x. Y , (Program)
NOTE: In this year (26), (27),
respectively referred to





































RDTE 1973 X, Y,, (Program)
Army
(1) 181,000 205,500 186,000
(2) 185,000 255,100 168,000
(3) 888 3 500 990,300 896,900
(4) 18,900 18,900 10,800
(5) 188,100 197,100 178,700
(6) 384,700 397,000 348,100
(7) 58,900 .58,900 62,200
Navy
(8) 135,400 154,100 143,600
(9) 367,900 384,900 609,400
(10) 904,600 1,026,300 520,900
(11) 89,800 99,800 43,000
(12) 451,600 430,200 411,300
(13) 44,800 44,800 60,000
(14) 507,000 517,500 440,700
(15) 159,100 159,100 152,900
Air Force
(16) 131,300 146,300 142,700
(17) 1,302,900 1,343,100 1,181,300
(18) 392,400 415,400 410,100
(19) 349,300 350,700 341,100
(20) 100,600 100,600 92,500
(21) 597,800 522,000 404,400
(22) 384,200 384,200 349,300
Defense Agencies
(23) 60,000 60,000 55,700
(24) 78,600 78,600 71,900
(25) 70,600 84,400 ' 78,600
(26) 13,200 13,900 26,000
(27) 12,300 12,900 13,400
(28) 17,300 17,300 14,200
(29)
NOTE: In this year (26), (27), and (28) respectively





1. Brown, R.B., Explanation in Social Science , Aldine
Publishing Company, Chicago, 1963
.
2. Byrne, R.F., and others (eds.), Studies in Budgeting
,
p. 292-321, North-Holland Publishing Company, 1971.
3. Congressional Action on FY— Budget Request by Appropri-
ation Title and Item , Department of Defense Appropriation
Bill, Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Comptroller) (Fiscal years 1971-1973 available for all
budget categories).
4. Crecine, J. P. and Fischer, G., On Resource Allocation
Processes in the U.S. Department of Defense , an
Institute of Public Policy Studies Discussion Paper
No. 31, October, 1971.
5. Davis, O.A., Dempster, A.H., and Wildavsky, A.j "A
Theory of the Budgetary Process," The American Political
Science Review , v. 60, p. 529-5^7, September, 1966
.
6. Department of Defense Appropriations, Research, Develop-
ment, Test and Evaluation (Part 4) and Procurement
(Part 7) j Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee
on Appropriations House of Representatives, U.S.
Government Printing Office, Washington: 1972. (volumes
from 1962-1973 used for this study)
7. Department of Defense Appropriations, Part 3-' Department
of the Navy, Senate Hearings before the Committee on
Appropriations, U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington: 1972. (volumes from 1962-1973 used for this
study)
8. Dixon, Wilfred J. and Massey, Frank J., Jr., Introduction
to Statistical Analysis
,
p. 193-215, McGraw-Hill Book
Company, New York, 19
6
"9".
9. Draper, Norman and Smith, Henry, Applied Regression
Analysis , John Wiley and Sons, Inc. , New York, 1966
.
10. Enke, Stephen, Defense Management , Prentice Hall, Inc.,
New Jersey, 1967.
11. Executive Office of the President: Bureau of the Budget,
Subject: Preparation and Execution of the Federal
Budget , April, 1966";
61

12. Fenno, R.F. Jr., "The House Appropriations Committee
as a Political System: The Problem of Integration," The
American Political Science Review, v. 56, p. 310-324,
June, 1962.
13. Penno, R.F., Jr., The Power of th e Purse: Appropriation
Politics in Congress, Little, Brown and Company,
Boston, 1966.
14. Harris, Joseph P., Congressional Control of Administration
,
The Brookings Institution, Washington, D. C. , 1964.
15. Hoel, Paul G., Port, Sidney C, and Stone, Charles J.,
Introduction to Statistical Theory
,
p. 111-157, Houghton
Mifflin Company, Boston, Mass. 1971.
16. Johnson, R.W., A Model of Federal Agency Budgetary Behav-
ior: Agency Requests as a Function of Environmental
Constraints
,
paper prepared for 1972 Annual Meeting of
the Public Choice Society , May 3-6, 1972.
17. Kanter, A., "Congress and the Defense Budget 1960-1970,"
The American Political Science Review , v. 66, p. 129-
14 3 , March, 1972.
18. Korb, Lawrence J., "Congressional Impact on Defense
Spending, 1962-19 73 •' The Programmatic and Fiscal
Hypotheses," Prepared for delivery at the 1973 annual
meeting of the American Political Science Association,
Jung Hotel, New Orleans, Louisiana, September 4-8.
Copyright, 1973, The American Political Science Asso-
ciation.
19. Lyden, F.J., and Miller, E.G., Planning, Programming
,
Budgeting , Markham Publishing Company, Chicago, 111.,
1972.
20. Navy Comptroller, Report of Programs (C) : DD Form l4l6
(FY 1972)5 31 December 1972.
21. NAVSO P-2457 (Rev. 7-72), Department of the Navy RDTE
Management Guide, Part I: System Description , July,
1972.
22. Novick, David (ed.), Program Budgeting , Holt, Rinehart
and Winston, Inc., New York, 1969.
23. Rand Corporation, Military Equipment Cost Analysis
,
p. 33-77, Santa Monica, California, June, 1971.
2 4
.
Summary of Fiscal Year POD Authorization and Appropri -
ations , Prinred for use of Senate Committee on Armed
Services, Committee Print Table (Fiscal years 1970,
1971, and 1973 for Procurement and RDTE available).
62

25- Theil, Henri, Principles of Econometrics , John Wiley
and Sons, Inc., New York, 1971.
26. Wildavsky, A., The Politics of the Budgetary Process
,






1. Defense Documentation Center 2
Cameron Station
Alexandria, Virginia 2231^
2. Library, Code 0212 2
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 939^0
3. LT J. R. Capra, Code 55Zm 1




k . Department of Operations Research 1
and Administrative Sciences, Code 55
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 939^0
5. Chief of Naval Personnel 1
Pers lib
Department of the Navy
Washington, D.C., 20370
6. CPT Joseph -G. Terry, Jr., USA 2




SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (Wlien Data Entered)
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE READ INSTRUCTIONSBEFORE COMPLETING FORM
1. REPORT NUMBER 2. GOVT ACCESSION NO. 3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
4. TITLE (and Subtitle)
;
A Methodology for Analyzing Congressional
Behavior Toward Department of Defense
Budget Requests
5. TYPE OF REPORT a PERIOD COVERED
Master's Thesis;
September 1973
6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER
7. AUTHORfs)
Joseph Garside Terry, Jr.
8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER("o;




10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK
AREA A WORK UNIT NUMBERS
11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS
Naval Postgraduate School
: Monterey, California 939^0
12. REPORT DATE
September 1973
13. NUMBER OF PAGES
66
U. MONITORING AGENCY NAME 6 ADDRESSfU different from Controlllnt Office)
Naval Postgraduate School
'' Monterey, California 939^0
IS. SECURITY CLASS, (of this report)
Unclassified
ISo. DECLASSIFI CATION/ DOWN GRADING
SCHEDULE
16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report)
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered In Block 20, If different f;om Report)
IB. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES






20. ABSTRACT (Continue on roveiTae aide ii asfcenamry end identify by block number)
\
A methodology based on the current Department of Defense
budgetary process and recent efforts to model federal budgetary
behavior is proposed for analyzing Congressional behavior
toward Department of Defense budget requests. Pour simple,
linear, stochastic models which associate Congressional
appropriations with DOD budget requests are suggested and
empirically tested via a cross-sectional regression analysis for
DO 1 JAN 73 1473 EDITION OF 1 NOV 65 IS OBSOLETE
(Page 1) S/N 102-014- 6601 I
65
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE fHTien Date Entered)

i'tt-UWITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGEfmion Data Enterod)
(20.)
Procurement and Research., Development, Test and Evaluation In
the 1970-1973 time frame. Results of the tests are tabulated
and discussed. Model strengths as well as weaknesses are
evaluated based on proportional and absolute measures of model






66 SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGEfWhsn Data Entorod)

Th


























c.l A methodology for ana-
lyzing Congressional be-
havior toward Department




3 2768 001 07478 4
DUDLEY KNOX LIBRARY
